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     A BSTRACT 
 
  Through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, substantial amounts of 
debt relief have been granted to a set of low-income countries as an alternative instrument of aid 
delivery.  The theoretical (and moral) arguments in favour of debt relief are well established.  However, 
the question whether debt relief is a more effective instrument of development assistance in practice is 
an empirical question.  Hence, in this paper we investigate, for a panel of 28 decision point HIPC 
countries, the intertemporal linkages between debt relief and other fiscal variables such as current 
expenditure, government investment, taxation and domestic borrowing, in comparison to the effects of 
more traditional forms of development assistance, namely (non-debt relief) grants and concessional 
loans.  To do so, we estimate a panel VAR and look at impulse response functions.  Overall, we find that 
HIPC (only) debt relief impact on fiscal variables to follow fairly complex dynamics.  For example, debt 
relief initially reduces government investment, but the effect becomes positive after two years, well 
outperforming other modes of aid delivery.       
 
 
Keywords: HIPC, debt relief, fiscal response, aid effectiveness  
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               1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The international community has recently embarked on an ambitious quest to trigger a 
substantial acceleration of economic growth and development, in order to try crushing poverty, 
especially in lower-income countries. Ambitions are centered on an international consensus on a 
concrete, albeit broad set of development goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For low-
income countries, documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) should translate 
these broad targets into country-owned development strategies; from the donor side, it has provoked a 
substantial redrawing of the overall aid architecture, at such a scale that some authors refer to it as a 
true paradigm shift (Renard, 2006). Apart from the scaling up of aid, improving the effectiveness of aid 
is a crucial element of concern in this new paradigm: results could be improved, not only by scaling up 
efforts,  but also by rechanneling scarce aid resources towards where they would be most productive in 
generating growth and reducing poverty. Moreover, it may be the case that aid effectiveness is not 
independent of the choice of aid modalties or instruments, leading to the importance of a disaggregated 
analysis of aid flows.   
 
Traditionally, economists have tried to answer the aid effectiveness question using standard cross-
sectional macro-economic growth models, through the inclusion of aid flows as an explanatory variable. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the results were inconclusive, reflecting the heterogeneous way in which aid is 
both given and used by different governments. More recently, especially since the World Bank Policy 
Research Report on Assessing Aid (1998), a new consensus, albeit with continuing dissent voices, seems 
to emerge: If aid is given to countries characterized by good governance, there is a positive impact on 
economic growth (Van de Walle and Johnston (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000)). This seems to 
confirm that, as in Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) “the core deficiency of this “aid-growth” literature is 
that it fails to recognize explicitly that aid is given primarily to the government, and that hence any 
impact of aid on the economy will depend on government behaviour, in particular how fiscal decisions on 
taxation and expenditure are affected by aid revenues” (p.1242). Again, the issue is raised that different 
aid instruments and modalities might provoke very different fiscal reactions of the recipient public sector 
(Mavrotas, 2002, 2005).    
 
During the last decade, debt relief has slowly made its way as an important element of the international 
‘Financing for Development’ agenda, through initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative, and more recently, at last year’s G8 summit in Gleneagles, where the G8 proposed to 
go beyond HIPC in granting additional multilateral debt relief to a specific set of countries, which is now 
known as the Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI). It is important to note that these debt relief 
initiatives nicely fit into the new aid architecture and the aid effectiveness debate: since debt relief to 
low-income countries is almost exclusively for debt owed to official creditors, these creditors are the 
same as those that provide (traditional forms of) aid to those countries. As such, debt relief is just one of 
the instruments of donor intervention (Berlage et al., 2003). So the crucial question is to what extent, 
and under which circumstances, debt relief is a more promising instrument than the more ‘traditional’ 
modes of aid delivery (project aid, program aid, either in the form of concessional loans or grants, 
technical assistance, etc.). Again here, differences in modalities may lead to differences in effectiveness, 
and differences in fiscal response behaviour of the recipient public sector. The idea that debt relief might 
be a more optimal form of aid delivery is in fact implicit in MDRI as this additional debt relief is very 
similar to budget support-type of aid, and will be granted to the beneficiary countries, i.e.post-HIPCs 
(only), partly as some substitute for it (Cassimon & Renard, 2006).  
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As noted by Chauvin and Kraay (2005), the arguments in favour of debt relief have ranged from the 
moral to the mundane. To concentrate on the latter, economic arguments are at least threefold. First of 
all, there is the direct effect that debt relief will free up public resources that would otherwise have been 
earmarked for debt service, i.e. the “fiscal space” (Heller, 2005) argument of debt relief. But even is this 
is not the case, and debt relief is merely “virtual”, i.e. an ‘accounting clean up’ of historic (and future) 
arrears accumulation, debt relief might still be an optimal reaction of donors for at least two good 
reasons
1. One is the so-called debt overhang argument, affecting both public and private sector 
behaviour.  For the private sector, an excessive debt stock might deter investment for fear of future 
taxation; for the public sector, Krugman (1988) shows that high debt service obligations reduce the 
incentive of debtors to engage in policy reforms that raise revenues available for debt service, since part 
of the additional revenues accrue to the creditor. As a result, on top of the actual debt relief savings, 
debt relief, by removing debt overhang, may help in relieving some key bottlenecks for growth 
acceleration in low-income countries. Finally, to the extent that donors may succeed in receiving truly 
“additional” development budget resources, by using the aid instrument of debt relief, debt relief may 
transform itself into the optimal instrument of donor policy to the extent that the intervention benefits 
the recipient country. Again, to correctly measure the impact of debt relief, one should make a detailed 
analysis of the fiscal response behaviour of a recipient government on donor interventions of the debt 
relief type.  Whatever the theoretical arguments, the actual impact of debt relief essentially remains an 
empirical question.  
 
Disaggregated analysis of the fiscal response of aid has so far tended to disregard the potential effect of 
debt relief as a separate aid category
2, which is rather surprising, as debt relief is becoming a substantial 
part of aid efforts and because of the reasons explained in the previous paragraph. This paper aims at 
contributing to the existing aid effectiveness literature by looking at the fiscal effects of debt relief, 
relative to other types of interventions, for a panel of 28 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), that 
have reached at least decision point in the HIPC, and are currently receiving (at least interim) debt relief 
within the HIPC Initiative. We focus on debt relief granted through the HIPC Initiative (only). In doing 
so, the paper uses recent insights and methodologies from different parts of the aid effectiveness 
literature in general, and the recent fiscal response literature in particular.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the recent literature 
related to the aid effectiveness, debt relief as well as fiscal response literature. Section three describes 
our empirical strategy for the estimating the panel vector autoregressive model and deals with data 
issues. The fourth section presents the estimation results and the last section concludes, while also 
discussing some preliminary policy consequences. 
 
 
 2.  AID EFFECTIVENESS, DEBT RELIEF AND THEIR FISCAL RESPONSES: 
   A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE AND PRACTICES  
 
  2.1.  Aid effectiveness and fiscal response 
 
  The importance of recipient government conduct for the effectiveness of aid is implicit in 
the so-called fiscal response literature. These studies focus on the interactions among several 
categories of public expenditure and domestic and foreign revenue.  More specifically, they try to look at 
the recipient government’s response to aid flows, in terms of the decisions between various sources of 
                                                                                                        
1 For a detailed discussion of this, see e.g. Cassimon & Vaessen (2006). 
2 One exception being McGillivray and Ouattara (2005).  
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revenue like taxation and domestic borrowing and areas of expenditure like public investment and 
recurrent government expenditure (Otim, 1996).   
 
Fiscal response models view governments as organisms that attempt to optimize the value of some 
ultimate target such as the rate of economic growth. In reality, governments do this by steering certain 
intermediate policy variables to their desired levels.  These policy variables differ from one study to the 
other, depending on the interest of the researcher, but usually include variables like public investment 
expenditure, government recurrent expenditure, tax revenue, public borrowing from domestic sources 
and aid (which can be disaggregated depending on the interest of the study).  The government utility 
function is specified as a quadratic loss function, where the government attains maximum utility if the 
targets for the decision variables are met.  This utility function is then optimised subject to the budget 
constraint that expenditures cannot exceed revenues.  From this, a system of structural equations is 
derived.  The parameters of this system are usually estimated using non-linear three stage least squares 
(NL3SLS). 
 
Since these models are about the conduct of different governments, empirical applications are mostly 
case studies. Furthermore, depending on the aim of the study, the models are often modified in ways 
that make comparisons difficult. For example, aid can be disaggregated into its different sources 
(multilateral, bilateral,  private,...) or by type (grants, loans,...). Overall, evidence suggests that loans 
tend to finance public investment, while official grants have a higher probability of leakage into 
government consumption (Heller (1975), Otim (1996)).  
 
When distinguishing between different sources, multilateral aid seems to be preferable to bilateral 
assistance (Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990), Otim (1996)). Another stylised fact is that aid often reduces 
domestic borrowing (Heller (1975), Morrissey et al. (2002)). A less robust finding is the effect of aid on 
taxation. While Heller (1975), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), Ahmed (1998) and McGillivray and 
Ouattara (2005) find a reduction in the government tax efforts, Khan and Hoshino (1992), Otim (1996) 
and Morrissey et al. (2002) find that taxation increased in response to aid. The taxation effect is not 
independent of the aid modality: aid in the form of grants has a danger of negatively affecting domestic 
tax mobilisation, while aid in the form of loans has a positive effect on domestic revenue mobilisation 
(Gupta, et al, 2004).  
 
Mavrotas and Ouattara (2005) also present a model that disaggregates aid into project aid, programme 
aid, technical assistance and food aid. They find that the government responds differently according to 
the nature of aid inflows. Technical assistance and food aid are mainly directed towards financing 
consumption whilst project aid and programme aid are used for investment purpose. Food aid and 
technical assistance does not reduce tax effort, and project aid and programme aid reduce borrowing.  
For Costa Rica, the effect of aid on government allocation of resources appears to have been negligible 
(Franco-Rodriguez (2000)). Finally, McGillivray's (2002) study on the fiscal response of the Philippine's 
government paints a dim picture: both bilateral and multilateral aid flows reduce public fixed capital 
expenditure and decreases taxation. 
 
Fiscal response models have been criticised on a number of grounds. White (1992) argues that the 
theoretical models used in these studies is a partial one since it does not allow for the impact of aid on 
income or poverty.  For instance, even if we know what the effect of aid is on tax collection, the question 
of how taxes affect income and growth still stands.  The need to presume the existence of, and estimate, 
targets for government expenditure and revenue is also seen as a weak point. According to Morrissey et 
al. (2002), the estimates for the structural equations are very sensitive to the way in which the targets  
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are approximated. They circumvent this problem by estimating fiscal response models in a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework. Their method also has the advantage of enabling the investigation of 
the dynamics of the relationship, accommodating another criticism that there is no attempt to analyse 
dynamic aspects of aid within fiscal response models (White, 2002).  
 
  2.2.  Fiscal response effects of debt relief  
 
  Disaggregated analysis of the fiscal response of aid so far has tended to disregard the 
potential effect of debt relief as a separate aid category. One notable exception is McGillivray and 
Ouattara (2005) who, in a case study of Côte d’Ivoire, look at the impact of debt service. They find that 
for Côte d'Ivoire, using a model that isolates debt service from total government expenditure, the bulk 
of aid is allocated to debt servicing.   
 
The absence of debt relief in disaggregated fiscal response studies is rather surprising, as recently, those 
granting or financing debt relief are the same as those giving new money in the form of either grants or 
concessional loans, i.e. debt relief by official creditors is simply one of the instruments of providing aid.  
 
In principle, debt relief, be it in the form of debt service or debt stock reduction, frees resources in the 
recipient country government budget that can be rechanneled into other spending (or used to reduce the 
fiscal deficit). As such, from a resource viewpoint, operations on debt relief are very much equivalent in 
nature to a new (aid) money inflow, when the new aid is delivered in grant form through some budget 
support modality. So, debt relief should in principle provoke fiscal responses. 
 
However, these fiscal response effects may not be so considerable in practice. As shown in the debt 
relief literature (see e.g. Cassimon & Vaessen (2006)), the general principle that debt relief mobilizes 
resources for other uses, is only valid to the extent that, in the absence of debt relief, debt would have 
been (fully) serviced. If this is not the case, the resource effect of debt reduction is virtual and refers 
mainly to an accounting clean-up of historical and future arrears accumulation. Real direct resource 
savings equal the share of debt service actually transferred in the absence of debt relief
3. So this might 
severely limit fiscal response effects as say, increased recurrent spending or public investment. 
 
However, fiscal response may be provoked in a more indirect way: An excessive debt burden can provoke 
a series of actions by the government, creating a vicious circle that can be stopped only by reducing debt 
to a sustainable level (in a broad sense). Excessive debt service might not only severely crowd-out 
spending on development priorities, it might also provoke sub-optimal fiscal and other government 
behavior (e.g. excessive domestic borrowing, excessive inflationary financing, excessive taxation of 
some sectors in the economy) and lessen incentives for economic reform. As a consequence, both 
private domestic as well as foreign investors might be discouraged to productively invest in the recipient 
economy. The overall result will be, among other things, a depressed economic growth rate. This is 
generally referred to as the debt overhang hypothesis
4.  
 
                                                                                                        
3 This is sometimes referred to as the economic value of debt relief, i.e. the present value of all future debt service 
payments that would effectively have been paid by the debtor in the absence of debt relief, with present value 
ideally measured at an appropriate (recipient country) discount rate and allowing for (partial or full) default.  
 
4 A lot of authors question the negative strict causality between external debt and growth for low-income countries. Rather, an 
excessive external debt is one of the symptoms of the systemic development problem of these countries. As such, a lasting 
solution calls for systemic changes, including tackling institutional, political and other weaknesses, of which debt reduction 
will also be a necessary ingredient.  
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In such a context, debt relief can constitute an important element of a package triggering a return to a 
virtuous circle. As such, on top of real debt savings, debt reduction might ultimately increase resources 
available to the government due to higher net aggregate flows, originating not only from private 
sources, but mainly from public sources. This works in two ways. First, a large debt burden might bring 
about a breakdown in selectivity of donor interventions as new interventions are funded in order to 
allow the country to stay current on debt service payments, rather than for development purposes. This 
has been denoted as ‘defensive lending’ (Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan, 2003). Debt relief can restore 
selectivity as the need for ‘defensive lending’ abates. Second, following the new aid effectiveness 
literature (see e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1988) once the debt problem is solved, it is 
optimal to increase interventions in that country since the productivity of one more dollar of aid is higher 
there. 
 
So far, empirical analysis has not focused on the factual fiscal response effects. Rather, the existing 
literature focuses on the effect of debt relief on outcome variables associated with aid effectiveness, like 
income (per capita) growth, poverty or private as well as public investment. One recent example is 
Chauvin and Kraay (2005). In their study, the try to assess the effects of debt relief on different outcome 
variables, like government investment, private investment, and economic growth or the quality of 
policies. Using an original panel dataset measuring the present value of debt relief of 62 low income 
countries, they find no convincing evidence of debt relief affecting any outcome variables. Although the 
fact that the authors appropriately model heterogeneity using panel data econometrics is clearly an 
improvement over the cross-section approach, we feel that it is too ambitious to directly connect debt 
relief to outcome variables, as we think this relationship is cluttered with time lags and innumerable 
other causal factors. 
 
As such, our approach is much less ambitious in that we restrict ourselves to analyzing the effect of debt 
relief on the fiscal sphere. In doing so, we are much closer to the literature that studies the fiscal 
response of governments. However, as will be explained later, we will opt for a vector auto-regressive 
(VAR) approach, instead of usual non-linear three stage least squares (NL3SLS). Furthermore, we also 
deviate from the fiscal response literature that is generally characterised by a case study approach in 
that we will look at a panel of counties.   
 
  2.3.  A particular application to HIPC debt relief  
 
  Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to debt relief embedded into the HIPC Debt Reduction 
Initiative. In 1996, on top of debt relief practices by bilateral creditors joined in the Paris Club, the HIPC-
Initiative pledges additional relief for a specific sample of low-income countries (only), the heavily-
indebted poor countries, in a once-and-for all effort that should bring them back to the level of 
sustainability, by reducing their debt to a common threshold debt level. Fair burden sharing between 
creditor (classes) is acknowledged as all creditors have to reduce their claims in an equiproportional 
way. It was enhanced in 1999, with threshold debt levels being lowered (in external terms, down to 
present value (PV) of debt to exports ratio of 150%; in fiscal terms down to a PV of debt to fiscal 
revenues ratio of 250%). At that moment, broad conditionality in the form of the PRSP requirement was 
formally introduced. 
 
Currently, 7 years down the road, 18 countries have fully completed the HIPC process, having reached 
the so-called ‘completion point’, and having received irrevocable debt stock relief down to the threshold  
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level
5. Furthermore, 10 countries are halfway, having reached a decision point agreement in which the 
amount of HIPC debt relief is determined (in principle) as well as additional conditionalities to be 
complied with by recipient countries in order to reach completion point. In the meantime, these 
countries receive so-called interim debt relief. 10 more countries still have to fulfill some entry 
requirements
6. Overall, currently committed debt relief amounts to about 33 billion USD in present 
value terms. 
 
A detailed study and assessment of the HIPC Initiative is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper
7. 
Here we restrict ourselves to some general conclusions that will be important for our analysis. First of 
all, the HIPC initiative has shown to be more than an ‘accounting clean-up’ operation leading only to 
virtual’ debt relief. Partly due to the fact that also multilateral creditors (IMF, World Bank, regional 
development banks) reduced their claims, roughly half of total debt relief can be said to reflect truly real 
savings, available for additional priority spending. Furthermore, although debt relief is officially claimed 
to be additional, clear signs of this additionality are only to be witnessed at recipient country level, 
especially for post-completion point countries where net flows have indeed gone up more than with the 
amount of debt reduced (IMF and IDA, 2004). This would indicate that fiscal response effects should be 
present, although not necessarily very substantial. 
 
Although debt relief practices have not been limited to the HIPC Initiative, we prefer to limit our 
analysis to HIPC debt relief. One reason is that most of the pre-HIPC debt relief can truly be labeled 
virtual, in the sense that it did most likely not lead to more resources being available in the budget in a 
cash flow sense, and, as such, fiscal response effects will be extremely limited. Moreover, getting more 
comprehensive annualized budget estimations of full debt relief, other than HIPC, will be very difficult, 
as we will explain in greater detail in section 3.2.  
 
 
 3.  MODEL ESTIMATION, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA ISSUES 
 
  In this study, we will not confine ourselves to time series data of one country, as is usual in 
the fiscal response literature. Instead, we will derive our coefficient estimates from a panel of 28 HIPC 
countries. There are several reasons why we choose to do so.   
 
First of all, note that the specific interest of this study lies in studying the fiscal effects of debt relief, 
relative to other effects. Restricting ourselves to only one country would probably leave us with too little 
variation to adequately identify the effects of debt relief on other variables. A second reason is that time 
series data for developing countries is difficult to come by, and the quality may be questionable. Again, 
to come to meaningful estimates, a sufficient number of time series observations is necessary. Third, the 
aim of this paper is to look at the effect of a policy, not the effect of a policy in a specific country.  If we 
want to estimate the likely effects that debt relief has on the public finance of recipient countries in 
general, it makes more sense to look at the average effect of different countries than to try and extract 
information about these effects only from a certain country’s own history.    
 
                                                                                                        
5 Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
6 Furthermore, the extension of the so-called sunset clause up to the end of 2006 potentially enables more countries (such as 
Haiti, Kyrgyz Republic and Nepal) to qualify as a HIPC country. 
7 See e.g. Claessens et al (1997) and Cohen (1996) for details of the rationale for HIPC, and e.g. OED (2004), Chauvin and Kraay 
(2005) for examples of preliminary detailed assessment studies.   
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  3.1.  A panel data VAR for fiscal response modelling  
 
  Traditionally, fiscal response models are estimated in their structural form using non-linear 
three stage least squares. However, it is well known that this method is extremely sensitive to the 
starting values. In this study, we follow Osei et al. (2005) and estimate the fiscal response model in a 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) modelling framework. The rationale for this choice of econometric model is 
that fiscal aggregates are highly interlinked, and therefore likely to be endogenous (Fagernäs and 
Roberts (2004)). In addition, the VAR framework enables us to graph impulse-response functions, 
which provide a convenient way to evaluate the effect of a shock in one variable of interest on another 
variable of interest. Like in Osei et al (2005), our VAR comprises the variables that one usually finds in 
fiscal response models (tax and non-tax government revenue, government current primary 
expenditures, government investment, local borrowing, external borrowing and external grants).  We 
also add debt relief as an additional aid aggregate. 
 
The first model we will estimate is a pooled VAR with two lags.  This model does not control for 
unobserved country heterogeneity, but might provide a useful baseline case.  To see why, suppose that 
the true model is:    
 
(1)  it i it it x x    + + = 1  
 
where x is the variable of interest, i denotes country and t denotes the time period.  Furthermore,  i   is a 
country specific, unobservable effect,   is our coefficient of interest which we want to estimate and  it   
is an error term
8.  If (1) is the true model, but we estimate the pooled VAR: 
 
(2)  it it it x x   + = 1  
 
the time invariant individual effects will be absorbed in the error term, and the explanatory variable will 
be positively correlated with this error term.  Standard results for omitted variable bias indicate that, at 
least in large samples, the OLS levels estimator for   is biased upwards (Bond (2002)).   
 
Hence, in a second model, we will allow for unobserved country specific means in the dependent variable 
by estimating a fixed effects model.  This could be done using the dummy variables estimator where we 
include country specific intercepts, or the within groups estimator, that transforms the variables in (1) to 
eliminate the time invariant unobservable effects.  However, this estimator is only useful when the 
number of time observations becomes sufficiently large.  To see this, consider the following fixed effects 
(within groups) estimator, which can be estimated by OLS: 
 
 
(3)  () () () i it i it i it x x x x     +  =  1  
 
The problem is that, in short panels, the within transformation introduces non-negligible correlation 
between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term.  Since the 
transformed lagged dependent variable is  () 1 1 1 ...
1
1
  + +

 iT i it x x
T
x , while the transformed error 
                                                                                                        
8 Note that the example is for a simple AR(1) model.  However, since the explanatory variables will be the same for each equation 
in our VAR, estimation can proceed on an equation by equation basis using OLS (Verbeek 2000).  Furthermore, extensions to 
higher order autoregressive models and models with additional explanatory variables are straightforward as explained in Bond 
(2002).  
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correlated with  1  it x .  Nickell (1981) has shown that this correlation is negative. 
 
The usual way to consistently estimate the   in short panels with large N is to use a transformation 
that does not introduce all realisations of the disturbance in the error term, like for instance first 
differencing: 
 
(4)  () ( ) () 1 2 1 1      +  =  it it it it it it x x x x     
 
 
However, here the dependence of () 1   it it    on  1  it   and of () 2 1    it it x x  on  1  it x  implies correlation 
between the error term and the regressor.  Hence, ordinary least squares estimates of   in the first 
differenced form will be inconsistent.  However, if we are able to find instruments that are both 
correlated to () 2 1    it it x x  and orthogonal to () 1   it it   , consistent estimates of the parameter vector 
can be obtained using two stage least squares.  One such candidate would be  2  it x .  So, provided there 
are at least three time series observations available, two stage least squares can be used to obtain a 
consistent estimate of  .   
 
When the panel has more than three time series observations, additional instruments become available 
for t>3.  For instance, for period t=4, we can now use both  1 i x  and  2 i x  as instruments. However, since 
the model is overidentiefied with T>3, two stage least squares is not asymptotically efficient. In this 
setting, the use of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) has been proposed (Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988), Arellano and Bond (1991)). These types of estimators have become known as difference GMM 
and are quite common in micro-econometric analysis.  This method has been extended to include also 
the equations in levels.  In that case, lagged variables in differences can be used as additional 
instruments.  This has become known as system GMM, which is the version we will use in this study.  For 
a non-technical account, see Bond (2002).    
 
Since our panel is roughly square, it is not clear which estimation method is most appropriate for us.  
The fixed effects version potentially suffers from the correlation between the transformed lagged 
dependent variable and the transformed error term mentioned above.  However, the fact that our panel 
is roughly square also means that we are constrained in the number of instruments we can use.  Since 
the system GMM method creates one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance, only 
using t-2 as instruments would result in about 140 instruments, well above the suggested rule of thumb 
to keep the number of instruments smaller than the number of groups.  In cases where the number of 
instruments is large relative to the number of observations, system GMM results are biased toward 
those of OLS.  Given this, we feel that the efficiency gains from system GMM will be rather small, hence 
our preferred model will be the fixed effects model on which we base the impulse response functions.  
However, we also report estimation results using system GMM using a slightly modified instruments 
matrix to reduce the number of instruments. 
 
Moreover, as in Osei et al. (2005), we will also investigate the fiscal response of the various variables 
using impulse response functions.  Impulse response functions can be used to graphically show the 
response of one variable of interest (for instance government investment) to a shock in another variable 
of interest (for example debt relief).  More specifically, we will use orthogonalized impulse response 
functions, which allows us to answer questions like “how does an innovation to external loans, holding 
everything else constant, affects government investment after 3 periods?”.  To calculate the impulse  
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response functions, we used the most popular approach proposed by Sims (1980), which involves a 
Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the shocks. 
 
 3.2.  Data  issues 
 
  The model is estimated for a sample of 28 HIPCs that have reached at least decision point 
status in the HIPC Initiative, and are receiving HIPC relief, either as interim relief, or, at completion 
point, irrevocable HIPC debt relief.  
 
For this sample, a database of fiscal variables is constructed by the authors, using data for these 
countries taken essentially from the budgetary data presented in IMF country reports, such as article IV 
reports, PRGF reviews, as well as HIPC decision and/or completion point documents. To the extent 
possible data are gathered spanning the period 1991-2004.   
 
The VAR model we estimate consists of seven variables.  Most of the variables are standard in the fiscal 
response literature, only the dissagregation may vary.  The first variable in the system is government 
revenue.  This variable is both tax and non-tax revenue. It also includes, when relevant, oil revenues, 
profits from state owned enterprises, etc. Next, we decided to disaggregate government expenditure 
into current expenditure and government investment.  Government current expenditure is net of interest 
payments.  Government investment includes net lending.  The fourth variable in our system is net 
domestic borrowing.  We also decided to disaggregate external financing into external borrowing and 
external grants.  Obviously, both loans and grants are net of any HIPC component. All HIPC, both loan 
and grant components, are in the last variable called debt relief. We decided to estimate a VAR with two 
lags, as more lags would leave us with too few degrees of freedom, and experimentation showed further 
lags were generally insignificant. 
 
It is important to discuss somewhat more extensively the debt relief data derived for this paper. Debt 
relief, including HIPC Initiative debt relief, cannot always be read immediately from the budgetary 
information provided by IMF reports and different countries use different ways of accounting for debt 
relief in their budget (see De Groot, Jennes & Cassimon (2003) for a more detailed treatment of this 
issue). HIPC debt relief has two major components: multilateral and bilateral debt relief. The 
multilateral part is typically accounted for as a grant and usually in a separate budget line
9. Bilateral 
debt relief is often much more difficult to trace, as debt service is often presented in the budget net of 
debt relief, without a separate budget line indicating the amount of debt relief embedded. However, 
within the framework of completion point triggers and the PRSP, IMF (and World Bank) are usually 
tracking very closely the amount of HIPC debt relief actually granted, which means that total HIPC debt 
relief are available, e.g. added as memorandum items to the country budgetary tables. As such, for HIPC 
debt relief, it is in general feasible to construct a variable representing the total annual debt service 
relief resulting from the HIPC Initiative.        
 
Obtaining such annualized figures is much more difficult for total debt relief figures, incorporating also 
historical so-called traditional Paris Club debt relief, and additional ad-hoc debt relief provided by both 
Paris Club and non-Paris Club bilateral creditors. For this type of debt relief, routine tracking is not 
performed and debt relief is summarized as exceptional financing ‘below the line’, where annual 
changes reflect changes in debt service arrears, and the impact of large rescheduling deals in the Paris 
Club involving clearance of debt service arrears stocks. Moreover, annual debt service relief figures 
                                                                                                        
9 As such, HIPC debt relief in the form of grants has to be deducted from the amount of aid given in the form of grants, so 
grant figures in our database are of course net of HIPC debt relief grants.   
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cannot be deducted from routine debt statistics such as in the annual World Bank Global Development 
Finance reports
10. Since this paper is largely focusing on the fiscal response of the HIPC Initiative, we 
only account for HIPC debt relief in this paper. 
   
 
 4.  A  DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
  Before running the VAR, we choose to express the different variables in our system as 
percentages of GDP rather than using the absolute amounts.  There are different reasons for why we do 
this.  First, it relieves us from converting the absolute figures into a common currency and having to 
deflate them.  Next, it also controls for the size of the economy.  Furthermore, it takes out unobserved 
effects that affect all countries and series in the same way, as for instance the effect of the global 
economy. 
 
Table 1 reports on the fiscal response effects of the different variables in our system.  As outlined above, 
we present three estimates of the VAR, one based on pooled OLS (panel A), a fixed effects VAR (panel B) 
and a system GMM VAR (panel C).  Remember that the pooled OLS model tends to overestimate the 
effects, while fixed effects tends to underestimate the effects.  However, given the structure of our 
panel, we think the fixed effects model comes closest to reality, so we will mostly look at the results of 
panel B.  Dependent variables are in the first row, explanatory variables (lagged once and twice) are in 
the first column. Since we are especially interested in the fiscal effects of aid, we will concentrate the 
lower half of panel B, which gives the impact of external borrowing, external grants and debt relief.   
 
                                                                                                        
10 An attempt to construct such a comprehensive data base is done recently in Chauvin & Kraay (2005), focusing on estimates 
of the present value of debt relief embedded in a debt relief deal obtained in a given year.  
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TABEL 1: ALL HIPC COUNTRIES 
 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
  













L1  0.773 **  0.259 **  0.164   -0.073   0.159 *  0.149 +  0.002   Government 
revenue  L2  0.116   -0.241 **  -0.151  -0.053  -0.193 *  -0.278 **  0.038  
L1  0.164 *  0.741 **  -0.063   0.165  -0.216 **  -0.022   0.145 **  Current 
primary 
expenditure  L2  -0.103   0.200 *  0.138  0.019  0.351 **  0.151 +  -0.162 ** 
L1  -0.076   0.104   0.400 **  0.106  0.034   -0.09   -0.072 +  Government 
investment  L2  0.099   0.06   0.441 **  -0.059  0.082   0.239 **  0.048  
L1  -0.058   -0.077   0.180 *  0.164 *  0.162 **  0.225 **  -0.014   Domestic 
borrowing  L2  0.034   -0.002   -0.112   0.353 **  -0.146 **  -0.152 **  0.004  
L1  -0.121   -0.142 +  0.117   -0.025   0.485 **  0.202 *  0.023   External 
borrowing  L2  0.127 +  -0.017   -0.052   0.067  0.097   -0.149 +  -0.025  
L1  -0.024   -0.057   0.229 +  -0.054   0.015   0.640 **  0.081 +  External 
grants  L2  -0.05   -0.065   -0.177   -0.018   -0.09   -0.002   -0.017  
L1  0.13   0.157   -0.351 *  -0.305  -0.292 *  -0.288 *  0.780 ** 
Debt relief 
L2  0.137   0.036   0.522 **  -0.171  0.363 *  0.417 **  0.007  




Panel B: Fixed effects regression 
 











grants  Debt relief 
L1  0.515  **  0.203  *  0.130   -0.094   0.072   0.237  **  -0.018   Government 
revenue  L2  0.006   -0.177  *  0.096   -0.065   -0.095   -0.051   0.047  
L1  0.127  +  0.525  **  -0.02   0.188   -0.192  *  -0.051   0.151  **  Current 
primary 
expenditure  L2  -0.135  +  0.133   0.077   0.082   0.358  **  0.071   -0.159  ** 
L1  -0.148  +  0.086   -0.005   0.139   -0.075   -0.233  **  -0.055   Government 
investment  L2  -0.004   0.084   -0.026   0.06   -0.084   -0.004   0.036  
L1  -0.037   -0.128  *  0.108  +  -0.077   0.072   0.195  **  -0.015   Domestic 
borrowing  L2  0.044   -0.091   -0.105   0.156  +  -0.189  **  -0.135  *  0.006  
L1  -0.115   -0.253  **  0.228  *  -0.128   0.369  **  0.199  *  -0.02   External 
borrowing  L2  0.077   -0.163  *  0.008   -0.039   0.005   -0.113   -0.047  
L1  0.136   -0.043   0.042   -0.134   -0.137   0.340  **  0.056  
External grants 
L2  0.109   -0.171  +  -0.082   -0.194   -0.157  +  -0.09   -0.029  
L1  0.063   0.169   -0.314  *  -0.193   -0.432  **  -0.282  *  0.694  ** 
Debt relief 
L2  0.237  +  0.017   0.438  *  -0.370  +  0.176   0.286  *  -0.025  
R²   0.92   0.86   0.91   0.41   0.76   0.87   0.65   
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Notes:  **,* and + denotes coefficient is significant at a 1, 5 and 10% significance level.  All regressions include a constant, 
which is not reported.  The number of observations is 277. L1 denotes lagged once and L2 denotes lagged twice.  System GMM 
estimate uses lagged levels dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments for the difference equations, and t-1 and t-2 for the levels 
equations. However, instead of creating one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance, we only create one 
instrument for variable and lag distance to avoid that the number of instruments becomes too large (i.e. we use the collapse 
option in xtabond2).  Estimation was done in Stata9.2 for linux, using the xtabond2 function written by Roodman (2005) to do 
the system GMM.   
 
The results in table 1 show that, of the 3 different aid variables, debt relief significantly affects 
government revenue (i.e. tax and non-tax revenue) and that this effect only appears after 2 years.  
An increase in debt relief appears to increase government revenue collection
11.  The effect proves quite 
robust, as it shows up in both the fixed effects and the system GMM results.  There is weak support in 
the system GMM results that external borrowing reduces government revenue collection in the next 
year, but the pooled OLS results suggest this effect is countered by an increased effort to raise tax and 
non-tax income in the second year.  There is also evidence that government revenue responds positively 
to government current expenditure.  Both the pooled OLS results and the fixed effects specification 
indicate the government revenue collection increases the year after an increase in government 
consumption.   
 
                                                                                                        















External grants  Debt relief 
L1  0.604  **  0.212  0.124   -0.342   0.119  0.222  -0.135   Government 
revenue  L2  0.092    -0.314  **  -0.230  +  -0.082  -0.329  **  -0.337  **  0.006  
L1  0.173    0.777  **  -0.036    0.350  *  -0.089    -0.086    0.173  *  Current primary 
expenditure  L2  -0.05    0.202  +  0.341  *  0.238    0.559  **  0.146    -0.116  + 
L1  -0.13    0.253  +  0.532  **  0.283    0.247  +  0.1    0.001    Government 
investment  L2  0.091    0.165    0.660  **  -0.001    0.285  *  0.462  **  0.099   
L1  -0.126    -0.215  *  0.056    0.088    -0.047    0.119    -0.053   
Domestic borrowing 
L2  -0.055    -0.125    -0.329  **  0.342  **  -0.386  **  -0.307  **  -0.037   
L1  -0.261  +  -0.297  *  0.063    -0.236    0.401  **  0.01    -0.046   
External borrowing 
L2  0.075    -0.042    -0.257    -0.092    -0.001    -0.284  *  -0.096   
L1  0.171    -0.211    0.215    -0.158    -0.226    0.498  **  0.092   
External grants 
L2  -0.092    -0.276  *  -0.286  +  -0.001    -0.332  *  -0.302  *  -0.014   
L1  0.244    0.218  -0.573  *  -0.572  *  -0.452  *  -0.239  0.748  ** 
Debt relief 
L2  0.399  +  -0.124  0.422  -0.428  0.064   0.28   0.037  
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Figure 1 shows the orthogonalised impulse response functions for the three aid variables for the all HIPC 
fixed effects specification.  The graph suggests similar effects of debt relief and grants on government 
revenue collection.      
 
Debt relief does not seem to significantly affect g government primary consumption.  Loans, be it 
external or domestic, appear to discourage future current primary expenditure. There is weaker evidence 
that external grants also reduce government consumption, but this effect is only significant after two 
years.  Furthermore, our fixed effects estimation results suggest that an increase in government revenue 
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Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of the three aid variables’ effect on current primary 
expenditure.  The graph clearly shows the discouraging effect external loans have on government 
consumption.  Debt relief, and to a lesser extend grants seem to increase government consumption over 
time. 
 
Our next variable, g government investment, is an interesting one, as in other fiscal response 
applications, this variable is thought to be central in linking aid to poverty reduction.  Hence a positive 
effect of the aid variables on government investment is seen as evidence of aid effectiveness.  For the 
complete sample, our fixed effects estimates suggest that aid in the form of grants goes not affect 
government investment.  Aid in the form of loans increases the share of GDP that goes to government 
investment.  The effects of debt relief are interesting.  In the first year after receiving debt relief, 
government investment seems to decrease. However, this effect is more than offset in the following 
year, where a 1 percent increase in debt relief as a share of GDP increases government capital 
expenditure as a share of GDP by 0.44.  For the non-aid variables, domestic loans also encourage 
government investment, although this effect is less convincing, and the system GMM estimates suggest 








051 0 1 5
step
oirf of totgrants ->   currprimexp
oirf of totloans -> currprimexp
oirf of totalhipc -> currprimexp 
IOB Working Paper 2006-02 • 17 
 























Figure 3 shows the corresponding impulse response functions, again for the three aid variables.  It is 
interesting to see the difference between debt relief and external loans.  While loans has a positive effect 
during the first two years it becomes negative in the third year, and stays like that for the rest of the time 
span.  For debt relief, we observer the reverse.  The first year following the shock in debt relief, 
government investment reduces, but from the next year onward, there is a positive effect, and the 
effects are fairly large.  The effect of grants is marginal. 
 
Looking at the results for government primary expenditure and government consumption together, our 
results seem to confirm what has been found in previous studies.  Government consumption seems to be 
mainly financed through own tax and non-tax income, while external grants and domestic borrowing is 
directed to longer term public investment projects.  The effects of debt relief on government expenditure 
are especially interesting.  Judged by the impulse response functions, debt relief seems to encourage 
both recurrent and capital spending.  However, in the later case, the effect is delayed, hinting at the 
existence of a j-curve effect. 
 
The only aid variable that affects d domestic borrowing is debt relief.  While the effect of a shock in 
debt relief on domestic borrowing is clearly negative, our system GMM estimates finds that this effect 
manifests itself in the year after the shock, while our fixed effects results suggest the effect is only 
significant at the second lag. 
 
It is also interesting to look at the intertemporal interactions between the three aid variables.  For 
instance, there is evidence that countries that receive debt relief are able to significantly reduce their 
external borrowing in the next year, providing support for the defensive lending hypothesis mentioned 
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next year, but this negative effect is offset in the next period.  In any case, is we look at the system GMM 
results, there appears to be no effect of debt relief on aid in the form of grants.  This is also shown in 
figure 4, which shows the impulse response of the 3 aid variables on aid in the forms of grants.  Indeed 
the response of grants to a shock in debt relief is initially negative, but is quickly offset. The response of 
grants to a shock in external borrowing mirrors the behaviour of debt relief. 
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5.CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we study the fiscal response effects of (HIPC) debt relief, relative to other forms of 
intervention, presenting results that are not limited to individual country context. Overall, we find that 
HIPC (only) debt relief impact on fiscal variables to follow fairly complex dynamics.  For example, debt 
relief initially reduces government investment, but the effect becomes positive after two years, well 
outperforming other modes of aid delivery. 
 
Our study wants to contribute to the aid effectiveness debate.  More specifically, we try to see if debt 
relief, a mode of aid delivery that has received renewed attention, provides a better alternative that aid 
in the form of grants or in the form of loans.  However, since we are agnostic about the precise channels 
through which aid affects outcome variables, we measure aid effectiveness not in terms of increased 
growth or poverty reduction, but confine ourselves to identifying the fiscal effects of granting aid. 
 
In doing so, we are closer to the field of study that is often labeled fiscal response analysis.  We use 
recent advances in this literature and study the impact of aid on fiscal variables in a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) framework as in Osei et al. (2005) and Fagernäs and Roberts (2004).  
Additionally, since we are interested in estimating the likely effects that debt relief has on the public 
finance of recipient countries in general, it makes more sense to look at the average effect of different 
countries than to try and extract information about these effects only from a certain country’s own 
history, hence we deviate from the case study approach that characterises the fiscal response literature 
and estimate a panel version of the VAR. 
 
We find that an increase in debt relief appears to increase government revenue collection.  For 
government expenditure, our results seem to confirm what has been found in previous studies.  
Government consumption seems to be mainly financed through own tax and non-tax income, while 
external grants and domestic borrowing is directed to longer term public investment projects.  The 
effects of debt relief on government expenditure are especially interesting.  Judged by the impulse 
response functions, debt relief seems to encourage both recurrent and capital spending.  However, in 
the later case, the effect is delayed, hinting at the existence of a j-curve effect. 
 
As for the interactions between the different aid variables, we find that countries that receive debt relief 
are able to significantly reduce their external borrowing in the next year, providing support for the 
defensive lending hypothesis.  The response of grants to a shock in debt relief is initially negative, but is 
quickly offset. The response of grants to a shock in external borrowing mirrors the behaviour of debt 
relief.  
IOB Working Paper 2006-02 • 20 
REFERENCES 
   
Ahmed, A., 1998, Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Developing Asia, in: Alauddin, M, Hossan, S. (eds), 
Development, Governance and Environment in South Asia: Special Focus on Bangladesh, (London: 
Macmillan). 
 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S.R., 1991, Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and 
an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic Studies 5 58, 277-297. 
 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O., 1995, Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimator of Error-
components Models, Journal of Econometrics 6 68: 29-51. 
 
Arslanalp, E. and P.B. Henry, 2005, Is Debt Relief Efficient, Journal of Finance, 6 60, 1017-1051.   
 
Berlage, L., Cassimon, D., Drèze, J., and Reding, P., 2003, Prospective Aid and Indebtedness Relief: A 
Proposal, World Development 3 31(10) 1635-1654. 
 
Birdsall, N., S.Claessens and I. Diwan, 2003, Policy Selectivity Foregone: Debt and Donor Behaviour in 
Africa, World Bank Economic Review, 1 17, 409-435. 
 
Blundell, R.W. and Bond, S.R., 1998, Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models, Journal of Econometrics 8 87: 115-143. 
 
Blundell, R.W. and Bond, S.R., 2000, GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data: An Application to 
Production Functions, Econometric Reviews, 1 19, 321-340 
 
Bond, S.R., 2002, Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice, Oxford and 
IFS, mimeo. 
 
Bond, J., Jaeger, D.A and Baker, R.M., 1995, Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation when the 
Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is Weak, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 9 90, 443-450. 
 
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D., 2000, Aid, Policies, and Growth, American Economic Review 9 90(4), 847-
868. 
 
Cashel-Cordo, P. and Craig, S.G., 1990, The Public Sector Impact of International Resource Transfers, 
Journal of Development Economics 3 32(1), 17-42. 
 
Cassimon, D. & J. Vaessen (2007), Theory, Practice and Potential of Debt for Development Swaps in the 
Asian and Pacific Region, forthcoming in Economic Systems 3 31(1).    
 
Chauvin, N.D., and Kraay, A., 2005, What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief Done for Low-
Income Countries?, World Bank mimeo. 
 
Claessens, S., E. Detragiache, R. Kanbur and P. Wickham, 1997, HIPCs' debt. Review of the issues, Journal of 
African Economies, 6 6(2), 231-254. 
  
IOB Working Paper 2006-02 • 21 
Cohen, Daniel, 1996, The Sustainability of African Debt, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No.1621, (Washington DC: World Bank).  
 
De Groot, A., G. Jennes and D. Cassimon, 2003, The Management of HIPC Funds in recipient countries. 
A comparative study of five African countries. Report of ECORYS to the EC, 46p. 
 
Fagernäs, S. & J. Roberts, 2004, Fiscal Impact of Aid: A Survey of Issues and Synthesis of Country 
Studies of Malawi, Uganda and Zambia, ODI, ESAU Working Paper 11, 44p. 
 
Franco-Rodriguez, S., Morrissey, O. and McGillivray, M., 1998, Aid and the Public Sector in Pakistan: 
Evidence with Endogenous Aid, World Development 2 26 (7), 1241-1250. 
 
Franco-Rodriguez, S., 2000, Recent Developments in Fiscal Response with an Application to Costa Rica, 
Journal of International Development 1 12, 429-441. 
 
Greene, W.H., 2000, Econometric Analysis (fourth edition), (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall). 
 
Gupta S.,Clements B., Pivovarsky A. and Tiongson E., 2004, Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does 
the Composition of Aid Matter, in: Gupta S.,Clements B. and Inchauste, G.(eds.), Helping Countries 
Develop. The Role of Fiscal Policy, (Washington D.C.: IMF), 385-406.  
 
Heller, P.S., 1975, A Model of Public Fiscal Behavior in Developing Countries: Aid, Investment, and 
Taxation, American Economic Review 6 65 (3), 429-445. 
 
Heller, P., 2005, Understanding Fiscal Space, IMF Policy Discussion Paper, No. PDP/05/4.  
 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., and Rosen, H.S., 1988, Estimating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data, 
Econometrica 5 56(6), 1371-1395. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., and Rosen, H.S., 1989, The Revenues-Expenditure Nexus: Evidence from 
Local Government Data, International Economic Review 3 30(2), 415-429. 
 
Imbs, J. and R. Ranciere, 2005, The Overhang Hangover, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3673, 
August 2005. 
   
IMF & IDA, 2001, Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, 
March 27, 2001, 29p. 
 
IMF & IDA, 2005, HIPC Initiative – Status of Implementation, August 19, 2005, 77p.  
 
Khan, H. and Hoshino, E., 1992, Impact of Foreign Aid on the Fiscal Behaviour of LDC Governments, 
World Development 2 20 (10), 1481-1488. 
 
Mavrotas, G. and Ouattara, B., 2003, Aid Disaggregation, Endogenous Aid and the Public Sector in Aid-
Recipient Economies: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2003/15. 
 
Mavrotas, G., 2005, Aid Heterogeneity: Looking at Aid Effectiveness from a Different Angle, Journal of 
International Development , 1 17, 1019-1036.  
IOB Working Paper 2006-02 • 22 
 
McGillivray, M., 2002, Aid, Economic Reform and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour in Developing 
Countries, CREDIT Research Paper No. 02/11. 
 
McGillivray, M. and Ouattara, B., 2005, Aid, Debt Burden and Government Fiscal Behaviour in Côte 
d'Ivoire, Journal of African Economies, 1 14(2), 247-269. 
 
Nickell, S., 1981, Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica, 4 49, 1417-1426. 
 
OED, 2004, Debt relief for the poorest: An OED review of the HIPC initiative, Operations Evaluation 
Department, (World Bank, Washington D.C). 
 
Osei, R., Morrissey, O and Lloyd, T., 2005, The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Ghana, Journal of International 
Development , 1 17, 1037-1053. 
 
Otim, S., 1996, Foreign Aid and Government Fiscal Behaviour in Low-income South Asian Countries, 
Applied Economics 2 28, 927-933. 
 
Renard, R. & D. Cassimon, 2001, On the Pitfalls of Measuring Aid, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 
2001/69. 
 
Roodman, D., 2005, xtabond2: Stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator. Center 
for Global Development, Washington. 
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s435901.htm 
 
Sims, C.A., 1980, Macroeconomics and Reality, Econometrica 48:1-48. 
 
Van de Walle, N. and Johnston, T., 1996, Improving Aid to Africa. (Washington, D.C.: Overseas 
Development Council). 
 
White, H., 1992, The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey, Journal of 
Development Studies 2 28 (2), 163-240. 
 
World Bank, 1998, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, World Bank Policy Research 
Report (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
 